Theorem 2
The total information which corrupted storage servers can see in the protocol is independent from the data owner's password and stored secret data , if the other servers and the data owner follow the protocol.
(Proof) We consider an attacker who corrupts t servers. The information that the attacker can see in
Registration phase is t shares of password and secret data , which are generated by using t-degree polynomials. Therefore, they are independent from and as in Shamir's SS. The information that the attacker can see in Pre-computation and communication phase is t shares of random numbers and "0" computed by honest servers, which are clearly independent from and .
The information that the attacker can see in Data reconstruction phase is t shares of ′. Even if ′ = , the shares are independent from and .
Note that this situation does not change even if the corrupted servers send fake shares to honest servers.
Theorem 3
Even if an attacker first corrupts t of storage servers, then participates in Data reconstruction phase pretending to be a data owner by utilizing the corrupted servers, the total information which the attacker can obtain is no information other than whether the guessed password P' is equal to the correct password P or not.
(Proof) Here we describe the proof in the case where there is only one data block. The generalization to the case of multiple data blocks is straightforward.
We consider an attacker who corrupts at most t servers = { 1 , … , } ⊆ {1, … , } and tries to get some information on password and/or secret data by pretending the data owner in Data reconstruction phase. In Data reconstruction phase, the attacker chooses a set of 2 + 1 servers, L, in which all corrupted servers are included. Then, � = {1, … , } ∖ is the set of honest servers,
} is the set of the honest servers that join the request-response process.
The attacker can obtain all information in the corrupted servers and all information what those servers can observe in all phases. Furthermore, the attacker and the corrupted servers can generate messages in arbitrary way and send them to honest servers � . Without loss of generality, we assume 1 < ⋯ < and ℎ 1 < ⋯ < ℎ +1 .
First, we list up all information the attacker views. In Registration phase, the attacker obtains the shares of P and D generated by the data owner using random polynomials P and D of degrees at most and 2 , respectively. In each Pre-computation and communication phase, the attacker obtains the shares of a random number ℎ and "0" generated by honest server h using random polynomials R ℎ and 0 ℎ of degrees at most and 2 , respectively. In each Data reconstruction phase (3-4), the attacker obtains ℎ as response which is computed by honest server h according to the scheme procedure. Thus, the information the attacker views through this attack is as follows:
Clearly, 1 , 2 themselves do not leak any information about password and secret data . Also, ′ 4 give no information to the attacker, because they are not used in Data reconstruction phase. On the other hand, 3 and 4 have the possibility to leak some additional information because they are related to the response 5 through R ℎ and 0 ℎ . So, we consider ( 3 , 4 , 5 ). (ℎ) and (ℎ) be the values sent from corrupted server c to honest server h as a share of random number and "0", respectively, in Pre-computation and communication phase. Let
Let
be the value that the attacker, at the beginning of Data reconstruction phase, sends to honest server h as a request. Note that these values may not be determined from polynomials, but there exists a unique polynomial P ′ ( ) of degree which satisfies P ′ (ℎ) = ′(ℎ) for all ℎ ∈ . Hereafter, we show that 3 , 4 , 5 has no additional information, unless ≠ P ′ (0) holds.
Each ℎ in 5 is computed by honest server h as follows:
Eq. (A.1) is written as
Then, all values in 3 , 4 , 5 are represented by the following linear equation: 
Because all values ( 0 , … , , 1 , … , 2 ) in the last term of Eq. (A.2) are chosen by the honest servers, they have uniform distribution. Thus, if the matrix is nonsingular, then ( 3 , 4 , 5 ) as a whole has uniform distribution and is independent from ℎ , D , (ℎ) , (ℎ) , and the choice of .
The non-singularity of is evaluated as follows.
Let be the -th row of the matrix and ′ be the matrix obtained by removing the -th row from the matrix . Then
By noting
, we obtain
Hence, det ≠ 0 holds if and only if P (0) = ≠ P ′ (0). Note that polynomial P ′ ( ) is determined by the values P ′ (ℎ) = ′(ℎ) sent from the attacker to the honest servers as password's shares. So, P ′ (0) can be considered as a "guessed" password ′ . Consequently, ( 3 , 4 , 5 ) has no additional information if the guessed password ′ is not equal to the registered password . This means that, no matter how the attacker acts co-operating with the corrupted servers, it cannot get additional information beyond the on-line dictionary attack.
In this attack model, the attacker is assumed to corrupt the t servers in L. If one thinks this assumption not realistic, we can slightly modify the scheme as follows. For every possible set L, Pre-computation and communication phase is performed by the servers in L (rather than all servers). When L is specified by the data owner in Data reconstruction phase, servers use shares of random numbers and "0" for the specified L. The used shares must be discarded, but shares for other set ′(≠ ) need not to be discarded. The security of this modified protocol is proven in a similar
